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Introduction 
 
 
Erdoğan’s “New Turkey” 
Restoring the Authoritarian State in the Name of Democracy 
Günter Seufert 
European and American commentators warn that Turkey is drifting back into authori-
tarianism, citing excessive police violence against demonstrators, restrictions on free-
dom of the press and internet, government interference in the judiciary, purges in the 
bureaucracy, and an anti-European policy shift. They note with astonishment that 
former prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was able to win the presidency on an in-
creased share of the vote despite credible accusations of corruption, strife within the 
conservative camp and foreign policy failures. Erdoğan himself speaks of the “New 
Turkey” having succeeded the old, authoritarian Kemalist republic and brought forth 
a progressive democracy. 
How broad is support for Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) across 
society? What can be expected of the new government? How fundamental is the recon-
struction of the political system, and what does the it mean for the future of democ-
racy? How can and should Europe respond? 
Turkish and international observers agree 
that the election of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
as President of Turkey on 10 August 2014 
marks a turning-point in the country’s po-
litical development. The new president sees 
himself not only as the head of state, but 
also as guarantor of the will of the people. 
For the first time since the founding of the 
republic, it is asserted, the government, its 
policies and the personality of the presi-
dent reflect the identity, the culture and 
the political inclinations of the population. 
And, it is also claimed, the cultural plural-
ity of the population is acknowledged for 
the first time, as witnessed by the peace 
negotiations with the banned Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK). The “New Turkey” is 
said to have overcome the political tutelage 
that the old secular elites exercised over the 
majority with the backing of the army and 
the judiciary. The new regime, it is claimed, 
is therefore not only culturally authentic, 
but also democratic. 
Erdoğan’s Electoral Success 
Including parliamentary and municipal 
elections and constitutional referendums, 
Erdoğan’s presidential victory with 51.8 
percent of the vote was his ninth successive 
election win. His widely noted charisma 
alone cannot explain this prolonged series 
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 of successes. What we are in fact seeing 
under Erdoğan is the conclusion of a long-
term process in Turkish politics: the incre-
mental integration of the conservative 
religious majority and the Kurds into the 
political system. Three military coups and 
the banning of 26 political parties are only 
the most obvious examples of measures 
taken since 1960 to exclude Kurdish and 
conservative Islamic actors from the Kemal-
ist republic. Even the AKP only narrowly 
escaped prohibition in 2008 – at a time 
when it was governing with an absolute 
majority. Prior to 2007, the political influ-
ence of the generals through the National 
Security Council and presidential vetoes 
had further restricted the options of con-
servative governments. 
Since the beginning of his career in the 
AKP, Erdoğan’s political discourse has con-
sequently revolved around “democratisa-
tion”, understood as asserting the will of 
the conservative majority against the politi-
cal control of the Kemalist elite. It was this 
project that gained Erdoğan his following 
across disparate classes, groups and regions 
and also found support abroad. 
During the clashes over the plans for 
the Gezi Park in Istanbul in summer 2013 
Erdoğan instrumentalised this established 
“democratisation discourse” to legitimise a 
blunt strategy of retaining power. Erdoğan 
has replaced the real decades-long political 
tutelage of the generals with an only imagi-
nary political “tutelage of foreign powers 
over the Turkish nation and its govern-
ment”. This has enabled him to present 
authoritarian moves against the opposition 
and interference in the judiciary as mea-
sures in defence of democracy and directed 
exclusively against foreign agents and 
stooges, above all the cadres of the preacher 
Fethullah Gülen within the bureaucracy 
(see Günter Seufert, Is the Fethullah Gülen 
Movement Overstretching Itself?, SWP Research 
Paper 2/2014). He employed this rhetorical 
brandmarking exceptionally successfully 
in the run-up to the municipal elections at 
the end of March 2014 and also in his latest 
campaign for the presidency. 
There are, admittedly, other reasons too 
behind Erdoğan’s leap in support from 
43.39 percent in the municipal elections to 
almost 52 percent in the presidential. Firstly, 
Erdoğan succeeded in uniting behind him 
the votes of smaller right-wing parties that 
did not put up candidates of their own, 
such as the Turkish-Islamist Felicity Party (SP), 
the Turkish nationalist Great Union Party 
(BBP) and the Kurdish-Islamist Free Cause 
Party (HüdaPar). A repeat of that impressive 
result is therefore not expected at the June 
2015 parliamentary elections. Secondly, 
many supporters of the “left-wing” Republic-
an People’s Party (CHP) and the “right-wing” 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP) were unable to 
bring themselves to give their vote to the 
joint candidate of the two parties. 
The New Government: Pro-European 
Gloss on Authoritarian Reality 
The new prime minister, former foreign 
minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, unveiled his 
first cabinet on 29 August 2014. A small 
sigh of relief was heard in Brussels, because 
foreign and European policy were entrusted 
to figures who are well-known in Europe. 
The new foreign minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, 
served briefly as European Union affairs 
minister and was from 2010 to 2012 Presi-
dent of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe. His previous post as 
European Union affairs minister was taken 
over by the career diplomat Volkan Bozkır, 
previously Turkey’s permanent representa-
tive to the European Union. The appoint-
ment of the previous economy minister Ali 
Babacan as one of the four deputy prime 
ministers and the retention of Mehmet 
Şimşek as finance minister were also wel-
comed as both are regarded as competent 
in their field and unideological. Moreover, 
the new Government Policy Statement at-
tributes the European Union central impor-
tance for the country’s modernisation, 
seeking accession for the republic’s cente-
nary in 2023. 
But the manner in which the new gov-
ernment presents itself to the population 
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 speaks a different language that fits more 
with the many passages in the Statement 
referring to Turkey as a civilisation in its 
own right, quite stark distinct from the 
European, with its own distinct “national 
values” rooted in Turkish Ottoman history. 
These inherent values of Turkish civilisa-
tion not only have to be renewed, it is con-
tended, but must also be asserted through-
out all state institutions, and the state must 
convey these values to the public. 
With state and government working to 
culturally and morally homogenise the 
population, the “democratisation” deployed 
to break the power of the secular elite has 
been replaced by a new authoritarianism, 
this time in the guise of conservative reli-
gious identity. 
After his nomination as party leader, 
Davutoğlu accordingly defined the AKP as 
a “cadre movement” that had appeared on 
the stage to revive and resurrect a deeply 
rooted state tradition rather than as the 
representative of the interests of large parts 
of the population. Under his leadership this 
“restoration” will be continued without 
interruption, he said. After assuming the 
party leadership, Davutoğlu declared that 
Turks would in future have to exercise their 
civil liberties within the constraints of a 
particular “moral formation” that was ap-
parently to be prescribed by the government. 
The ideology used to justify this authori-
tarian state and the restriction of civil liber-
ties is a hotchpotch of Turkish nationalism, 
religious piety and enthusiasm for the pan-
Islamism of Abdul Hamid II, the last politi-
cally influential Ottoman sultan. It is poign-
antly expressed in a recent propaganda 
video commissioned by the party to intro-
duce its new leader. The film presents 
Davutoğlu as “the hope of the Muslim weary 
and burdened”, “true to the message of the 
prophet”, “descended from Ottomans and 
Seljuks”, the “long-awaited spirit of [Otto-
man Sultan] Abdul Hamid II” and “trusted 
advisor to the leader [i.e. Erdoğan]”, working 
“for the umma, for the Turkish Muslim 
religious nation, and for Allah”. Erdoğan 
for his part likes to see himself in the man-
tle of Atatürk’s successor, likewise leading 
the fight to liberate his country from West-
ern domination. In fact he believes he sur-
passes his predecessor in this respect, be-
cause his endeavours for the national cause 
always have the majority of the population 
behind them. 
This mixture of nostalgic yearning for 
former national greatness, anti-Western 
nationalism and conservative morality 
cannot produce clear domestic or foreign 
policy programmes. But the “New Turkey” 
discourse establishes a new hierarchy of 
political identities, with the government 
seeking to secure a monopoly over central 
political concepts such as nation, national 
interest, justice, progress and religion. Gov-
ernment rhetoric holds up Erdoğan and 
the AKP as indispensable for the existence 
and future of fatherland and nation and 
discredits the opposition. Erdoğan and his 
circles have no qualms about labelling oppo-
sition politicians saboteurs, traitors and 
foreign agents. This all serves to legitimise 
curtailing rights and liberties and to secure 
power for the current government and the 
governing party. 
From this point it is but a small step to 
open rejection of so-called European values 
and any orientation on Europe at all, as pro-
pagated by Erdoğan’s chief economic advisor 
Yiğit Bulut. As it has with Russia, Europe has 
undermined Turkey’s culture in order to ex-
pand its own influence, Bulut writes in the 
pro-government Star newspaper. The only 
way to new strength, he says, is to return to 
the country’s own tradition. 
The Party: Our Programme 
Is Erdoğan! 
The ambiguity of the current AKP ideology 
and the vagueness of the policies that flow 
from it pose no difficulties for the party, 
which has handed all decisive decisions to 
its founder and former leader Erdoğan. “We 
stand with Erdoğan and his ‘New Turkey’ 
and against all who reject him and this 
ideal,” Yalçın Akdoğan tweeted on 13 August, 
at the time still Erdoğan’s chief political 
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 advisor and today one of the new prime 
minister’s four deputies. Erdoğan does 
indeed embody one of the central traits of 
the AKP ideology, the fusion of state and 
nation into a single entity, with Erdoğan 
himself, as both representative of the state 
and tribune of the people, at its heart. 
Where a man and his vision become 
programme there is no room for consulta-
tion, not even for discussion. And the party 
organs do indeed have little say when it 
comes to defining the AKP’s political posi-
tions. Members of party organs submit 
their opinions in sealed envelopes that are 
passed to the party leader. When parliamen-
tary candidates are selected, their standing 
in the party is irrelevant. Prime Minister 
Davutoğlu, the new party leader, equates 
internal discussions with “discord” and 
“machination” and calls on members to 
come directly to him with their complaints. 
While an extremely powerful leader and 
correspondingly weak organs are typical for 
Turkish political parties in general, today’s 
AKP represents an extreme in three respects. 
Firstly, Erdoğan has surrounded himself 
over the years with a circle of mostly 
younger coopted advisors who depend di-
rectly on him because they have little or 
no following in the party and mostly not 
even a parliamentary seat. They include 
the aforementioned Yalçın Akdoğan and 
Yiğit Bulut. Bulut has no seat in parliament, 
Akdoğan only since 2011. Numan Kurtul-
muş, also without a parliamentary seat, 
resigned his leadership of the newly-found-
ed left-Islamist People’s Voice Party (HAS) in 
September 2012 to take up Erdoğan’s invi-
tation to join the AKP, where he is now one 
of the four deputy prime ministers. Süley-
man Soylu, former leader of the marginal 
Democratic Party (DP), was also enticed away 
by Erdoğan in September 2012 and is today 
one of the AKP’s deputy leaders. İbrahim 
Kalın became Erdoğan’s chief foreign affairs 
advisor in 2009, following the appointment 
of his academic mentor Ahmet Davutoğlu to 
the post of foreign minister; today Kalın, 
who also has no seat in parliament, is depu-
ty secretary-general of the presidency. An-
other prominent figure without a parlia-
mentary seat is Efkan Ala, who in December 
2013 succeeded Interior Minister Muammer 
Güler after corruption allegations forced 
Güler and three other cabinet ministers to 
resign. Emrullah İşler, member of parlia-
ment since 2011, also joined the cabinet 
under the same circumstances and served as 
deputy prime minister in Erdoğan’s last 
cabinet. This group of relatively young Erdo-
ğan loyalists is set to advance into the cabi-
net after the June 2015 parliamentary elec-
tions and continue his policies there. 
This will be all the easier owing to a 
second peculiarity of the AKP: At Erdoğan’s 
insistence the party upholds a provision in 
its statutes restricting its members of parlia-
ment to three legislative periods. This will 
prevent 73 of the current 312 AKP deputies 
from standing again, including four current 
and former deputy prime ministers, 15 cur-
rent and former ministers, the current and 
a former speaker of parliament and a large 
number of individuals who hold or have 
held leading positions in the party. If the 
rule remains in force, Erdoğan will by the 
2015 election have rid himself of all the 
heavyweights in the parliamentary group 
who possessed the potential to form the 
core of an internal party opposition. Bülent 
Arınç, Ali Babacan and Sadullah Ergin have 
often been mentioned in this context. They 
would be as thoroughly politically sidelined 
as today Abdullah Gül, Erdoğan’s predeces-
sor as president. 
A third peculiarity of the AKP is that its 
decision-making centre in the person of 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan formally operates 
outside of the party and is thus immune to 
the influence of party members. Erdoğan 
has entrusted the running of party and cabi-
net to the triumvirate of Ahmet Davutoğlu, 
Yalçın Akdoğan and Numan Kurtulumş, 
who have no meaningful base of their own 
in the party. 
All this works to hinder opinion-forming 
processes and block participation by party 
structures in internal political decisions, 
and brings to a halt the very dynamic that 
generated the AKP’s long period of growth. 
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 In its early years the party addressed not 
only the interests of conservative Muslim 
groups, but also integrated many centre-
right politicians, influential Kurds, individ-
ual social democrats, as well as strongly pro-
Western Muslims. As the moderate opposi-
tion to the Kemalist state, the AKP enjoyed 
broad support among the liberal public. 
Today it is perceived in those quarters as 
itself wielding state power and quite pre-
pared to turn authoritarian instruments 
against its opponents. 
De facto Introduction of a 
Presidential System 
In his speech of 27 August thanking del-
egates after his election as party leader, 
Davutoğlu set the party an immediate goal 
of achieving a two-thirds majority in the 
June 2015 parliamentary elections, which 
would allow the party and its government 
to amend the constitution as it pleased. 
The primary objective here concerns the 
introduction of a presidential system. The 
fact that Davutoğlu sets this objective, 
working to weaken both the AKP-dominated 
parliament and his own government, to the 
benefit of President Erdoğan, says a great 
deal about the balance of power between 
prime minister and president. 
De facto, Erdoğan’s election as president 
has already transitioned Turkey to a presi-
dential system, even if the constitution still 
provides for a parliamentary one. The new 
cabinet clearly bears Erdoğan’s hallmark. 
His prime minister never tires of reiterating 
that his policies are guided by Erdoğan’s 
vision. Nor does the president shy from 
publicly announcing the instructions he 
has given or intends to give his prime 
minister for dealing with specific political 
problems. 
Interfering and Politicising: 
The Fate of Justice and Legality 
The reckless attitude towards the spirit of 
the constitution expressed in these actions 
is also echoed in treatment of the letter of 
the constitution and other legal norms. 
Thus Erdoğan ignored Article 101 of the 
constitution, which stipulates that the 
president must sever any party member-
ship and resign from parliament as soon 
as he is elected. Erdoğan retained both, 
made sure he installed Davutoğlu as his 
successor, and only resigned from parlia-
ment after he was sworn in as president. 
In view of the forcefulness of the new 
power elite, there is a danger not only of 
erosion of the constitution and laws as con-
straint and corrective on the executive, but 
also of the same happening to the judiciary. 
As soon as corruption investigations 
against members of Erdoğan’s cabinet 
began in December 2013, his government 
applied pressure on the Supreme Board 
of Judges and Prosecutors (SBJP), the legally 
independent self-governance body of the 
judiciary. The government achieved changes 
in its composition and the transfer to other 
duties of the prosecutors and judges investi-
gating the corruption cases, as well as by 
decree more broadly restricting the scope 
of investigations by state prosecutors. 
A hastily cobbled-together judicial reform 
and pressure on the SBJP to appoint tame 
judges secured the government influence 
over first and second-instance decisions 
affecting detentions and arrests. After the 
involved judges and prosecutors had been 
replaced it came as no surprise that the 
pending corruption cases against four of 
Erdoğan’s ministers and his son Bilal were 
dropped. 
As well as interfering in the judiciary, 
the government exploits low standards to 
politicise prosecutions. For example, the 
aforementioned cases were dropped on the 
grounds that the investigators had been 
involved in a plot to topple the government, 
and the original prosecutors and police 
found themselves facing prosecution. The 
charges against leading members of a foot-
ball fan club that played a decisive role in 
the Gezi Park demonstrations in Istanbul 
in summer 2013 were also “attempting to 
overthrow the government” and topple the 
political order. Here too, prosecutors politi-
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 cised the trial by focusing on supposed 
political intentions rather than concrete 
provable crimes. 
Prime Minister Davutoğlu is also taking 
sides in advance of the upcoming election 
of SBJP members on 12 October 2014, saying 
following his election as party leader that 
he wanted to put an end to the judiciary’s 
control over politics. In his latest statement 
Davutoğlu also claims that parts of the judi-
ciary stand under foreign influence, which 
would appear to foreshadow further steps 
to shape the judiciary to the government’s 
wishes. 
A Stronger, Larger Intelligence 
Service 
As well as counter-intelligence, the National 
Intelligence Organisation (MİT) is responsible 
for both internal and foreign intelligence. 
It shares responsibility for domestic infor-
mation-gathering with the intelligence 
services of the police, the gendarmerie and 
the general staff, creating long-running 
inter-agency rivalries and conflicts. 
Until the mid-1990s MİT was regarded as 
the preserve of the military. The AKP gov-
ernment was the first to succeed in estab-
lishing a clear hierarchy of services and 
placing MİT at the top. Today MİT is a cen-
tral foreign and domestic tool of the gov-
ernment. The negotiations with Abdullah 
Öcalan’s PKK are conducted through MİT 
channels, and it remains responsible for 
coordinating official and unofficial co-
operation with Sunni and Salafist groups 
fighting in the Syrian civil war. A move in 
January 2014 to seek a judicial review of 
these activities ended with charges against 
the investigating gendarmerie officers and 
a news blackout. MİT also arranged the 
exchange of 46 Turkish hostages for Islamic 
State prisoners, which took place on 19 Sep-
tember. 
In May 2010 Erdoğan’s advisor Hakan 
Fidan was appointed head of MİT. Between 
2012 and 2014 his budget expanded by 40.2 
percent; further increases are planned for 
the coming years. In the first half of 2011, 
the government transferred control of 
Turkey’s biggest listening post from the 
armed forces to MİT. Technical neglect and 
embarrassing revelations about top gener-
als created the opportunity for this move, 
as part of the government’s strategy of 
breaking the domestic power of the mili-
tary. In response to investigations against 
Hakan Fidan for “running errands for the 
PKK”, conducted by prosecutors close to 
Fethullah Gülen, the government in March 
2012 rushed a law through parliament to 
strengthen the immunity of intelligence 
agents. And in August 2014 the service’s 
powers were expanded to grant it almost 
unrestricted access to documents and ar-
chives of all government agencies, courts 
and non-state institutions. Its powers to 
conduct large-scale electronic and digital 
eavesdropping without judicial control 
were also expanded. The founding of a 
parliamentary committee to control the 
intelligence services, originally planned 
for April 2014 is still awaited. 
Peace Talks with the PKK: 
Substitute for Democratisation? 
Apologists for Erdoğan’s argue that his 
strong position is politically acceptable, 
because only he and the AKP are willing to 
lead the negotiations with the PKK to a 
conclusion. The eighteen-month cease-fire 
and the recognition of Kurdish identity, 
rights and demands achieved during that 
period, they say, represent important steps 
towards democracy and are the precondi-
tion for further progress. 
But however true the theory that democ-
ratisation cannot advance without a solu-
tion of the Kurdish question, so problem-
atic is the simple equation of greater cultur-
al freedom with greater political freedom. 
In the pre-Erdoğan Kemalist state the de-
liberate exclusion of pious Muslims, Kurds, 
Alawites and non-Muslims established a 
cultural monism that hampered or com-
pletely prevented political participation by 
all these groups. But the Kemalist state was 
politically pluralistic. Different political 
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 parties had the chance to form the govern-
ment, while the courts and veto powers like 
the military – democratically legitimated 
or not – constrained the power of the gov-
ernment. Erdoğan’s “New Turkey” is un-
doubtedly culturally more pluralist than 
the Kemalist state, but ruled by political 
monism. Only one party has any chance to 
form a government, the judiciary’s hands 
are increasingly tied, and actors that once 
enjoyed veto power are frozen out. 
Summary: Power Relations in 
the “New Turkey” 
Unlike the government and the pro-govern-
ment press would have one believe, Erdo-
ğan’s “New Turkey” is not characterised by 
growing democracy. Nor is the successful 
integration of the conservative Muslim popu-
lation into political decision-making and the 
associated expansion of political participa-
tion attributable to President Erdoğan’s “New 
Turkey”. It is true that the AKP achieved 
both, but that process occurred between 
2005 and 2011 rather than more recently. 
The situation today is characterised by 
the consolidating power of one person and 
a concomitant relativisation of the influ-
ence of institutions without which democ-
racy is inconceivable: the political parties 
(including the AKP), parliament, the judi-
ciary, codified law and the constitution. 
Erdoğan stands outside the influence of his 
party, which however retains its hegemony 
over parliament. Following a series of 
purges the government has the bureauc-
racy and in particular the police firmly in 
hand. The weakening of the Kemalist ideol-
ogy robs the once influential military of 
the possibility to mobilise the minimum of 
public support required for intervention in 
the political process. The press is, as amply 
documented, exposed to existential pres-
sure from a government that is simulta-
neously tightening its grip on the judiciary. 
The intelligence service has been finan-
cially and technically upgraded gained 
expanded powers, and stands de facto 
under the authority of the president. 
The European Union’s Dilemma 
In view of the situation as outlined, it is 
very questionable whether Turkey still 
fulfils the Copenhagen criteria that were 
the political precondition for starting 
accession negotiations. This presents the 
European Union with a dilemma. Turkey 
is too important in economic, foreign 
policy and security terms for Brussels and 
the EU member states simply to forget 
about exerting influence on Ankara. But 
they cannot ignore the fact that the inter-
nal drive towards democratisation sparked 
by the rise of the AKP has exhausted itself 
for the moment. The period when it was 
sufficient for the Union to keep a willing 
Turkey at arm’s length and administer the 
status quo is over. It is also a fact that the 
Union has failed to integrate Turkey in its 
foreign and security policy over and above 
the accession talks, however such an inte-
gration might have been imagined. Euro-
pean Union can only regain influence if it 
revives the accession talks. 
Turkish support for EU membership has 
increased significantly, from 45 percent in 
2013 to 53 percent in 2014. As this demon-
strates, in a time of crisis for the Turkish 
political system the European Union can 
once again become the guiding light of 
democratic developments. Explicitly secu-
lar forces, the Alawites, and even parts of 
the religious conservative spectrum see 
themselves facing government repression. 
Against this background, European stand-
ards of fundamental rights, freedom of the 
press and the judiciary can again become 
the common denominator of an otherwise 
often uninspired and bland opposition. 
One concrete step towards invigorating 
negotiations and injecting a new dynamic 
towards democratisation would be to exer-
cise pressure on the government of Cyprus 
to abandon its blockade of talks on chapters 
23 (justice and basic rights) and 24 (security, 
freedom and justice). Another could be to 
include demands for rule of law and trans-
parency in the negotiations over visa-free 
travel and revising the customs union, in 
both of which Turkey has great interest. 
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